Copenhagen’s Disappointing Denouement: Anatomy of a Failed Convocation

Richard Faulk. "COPENHAGEN’S DISAPPOINTING DÉNOUEMENT: ANATOMY OF A FAILED CONVOCATION" Andrews Litigation Reporter 30.11 (2009).

All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players; They have their exits and their entrances, And one man in his time plays many parts, His acts being seven ages.

–William Shakespeare, ‘As You Like It,’ Act 2, scene 7

The United Nations climate change conference is over. For two weeks, the U.N. and its member countries waited expectantly for “change” — waited, cajoled, argued, accused, threatened and, ultimately, disappointed everyone involved as they struggled on the “world stage” in Copenhagen. Tens of thou- sands watched inside and outside the Bella Center while the convocation be- came ever more divisive and quarrelsome as the “developing” nations of the world demanded that their “developed” counterparts “share” their wealth and technology to “save the planet.”

From the beginning of the conference, few informed attendees realistically expected significant progress, largely because of the twin problems of funding sufficiency and verification. They were not disappointed. In the end, the conference fulfilled realistic expectations by delivering no legally binding agreements. Considering the energy, enthusiasm, cost and political capital spent pursuing elusive commitments, many terms can be used to describe the convocation — but “successful” is not one of them.

Entering the final day of the conference, some hope existed that the Unit- ed States and China would bridge their differences. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech Dec. 17 was welcomed when she said the U.S. would participate in a $100 billion annual fund to help developing nations deal with climate change. Although she conditioned the plan on trustworthy verification, the proposal extended a hand across the negotiating table and challenged China and other “developing nations” to make a responsive com- promise. When China acknowledged its general willingness to discuss some sort of verification procedure, optimism rose in the hall. It seemed that the foundations for a deal were being laid, but the conciliations, however intriguing, came very late in the process.

As the day dawned on Friday, Dec. 18, Copenhagen awoke to find itself blanketed with snow — with more on the way. Perhaps it was an omen, a sign that nature herself had little enthusiasm for the negotiations. Perhaps it also foreshadowed the still frozen attitudes of the delegates who, despite a slight thaw the day before, froze permanently in that posture overnight. As leader after leader took the podium, it became apparent that the nations were unwilling, while on stage, to concede anything. Some speeches were hostile and aggressive, particularly toward the United States, as the U.N. gave the floor to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales, the president of Bolivia. These figures were impatient and angry.

“The time has come for everyone. We can’t spend days and days here,”Morales said.

Morales traced the issue to a conflict of political systems.

“Who is responsible?” he asked.”The responsibility lies on the capitalist system — we have to change the capitalist system.”

To a greater or lesser extent, virtually all speakers believed that the solution lay with the United States. Their remarks focused on the American president, Barack Obama, and anticipated that, at last, he would make new concessions to inspire the conference to reach a binding agreement. Their hopes were misplaced. Earlier in the day, Obama stressed that time was “running out” for deal-making but suggested that progress was made in a private meeting with China Premier Wen Jiabao. When the president finally stood at the podium and addressed the conference, however, he offered nothing new. Although he affirmed that he came “not to talk but to act,” he merely reiterated the firm position taken by U.S. negotiators throughout the conference.

Obama said the U.S. would leave Copenhagen with- out an agreement rather than accepting some “hollow victory” where the developing nations refused to allow international monitoring and verification. He expressed deep frustration with the U.N. process, noting, “These discussions have taken place for two decades, and we have very little to show for it other than an increase and acceleration in the climate change phenomenon.”

By the time Obama’s speech ended, it was clear that the nations were no closer to an agreement than when the day began.

Given the high expectations for Obama’s remarks, his speech was sharply criticized. The Guardian summed up the reaction: “[T]he words rang hollow and there was a palpable sense of disappointment in the audience. ... The lackluster speech proved a huge frustration to a summit that had been looking to Obama to use his stature on the world stage — and his special following among African leaders — to try to come to an ambitious deal.”

The BBC saw the scene dramatically: “Around the Bella Center, delegates huddled around TV monitors listening with rapt attention — some, doubtless, hoping that the president would bring a rabbit out of a hat, a conjuror sprinkling some magic dust to create a fairytale deal out of what is at the moment a bottom- less morass of texts and tensions.”

No such sorcery occurred, however. Indeed, rather than seeking compromise, Obama highlighted the vast differences left unresolved.

Of course, Obama, as an American president and not a despot, could do nothing more without congressional assent. Moreover, even if he had the authority to bind the United States to a significant accord in Copenhagen, the political reactions his decision would have been severe, potentially compromising his legislative agenda for the remainder of his term. Hence, no informed observer should have been surprised by Obama’s remarks. Undoubtedly, the president was keenly aware of his limitations, and he wisely stayed within the limited authority of his office. His stature as a “world leader” may have been diminished by this decision, but to maintain it, he would have been forced to betray the American people — the constituency that actually elected him.

hose who hurled insults at Obama, such as Chavez, either fail to understand our democratic system or, perhaps, prefer despotism to truly representative government. Moreover, Obama was not the only leader who remained tied to prior negotiating positions. Chinese Premier Wen, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also enerally repeated previous positions. For some reason, however, they were not singled out for extraordinary criticism.

As the day dragged on, the mood of the conference soured. At one point the Chinese and Indian delegations staged a “walkout,” and fatalistic observers imagined a total breakdown in negotiations. Despite the rumors, negotiations continued, largely focusing on the impasse between the U.S. and China. Finally, Obama emerged to announce that an agreement had been reached based upon a text that provided:

Today, following a multilateral meeting between President Obama, Premier Wen, Prime Minister Singh, and President [Jacob] Zuma [of South Africa] a meaningful agreement was reached. It is not sufficient to combat the threat of climate change but it is an important first step.

We entered this negotiation at a time when there were significant differences between countries. Developed and developing countries have now agreed to listing their national actions and commitments, a finance mechanism, to set a mitigation target of 2 degrees Celsius and to provide information on the implementation of their actions through national communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines.

No country is entirely satisfied with each element but this is a meaningful and historic step forward and a foundation from which to make further progress.

We thank the emerging economies for their voluntary actions and especially appreciate the work and leadership of the Europeans in this effort.

The short text was reworked over the next few hours and a revised political agreement — not legally binding on any nation — was produced. (See p. 25 for the accord.) Generally, the revised deal, known as the “Copenhagen accord,” included agreements to cap worldwide temperature increases rise by significantly reducing emissions and financing projects in developing nations to combat climate change. Although the original shorter text was prepared by the United States, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, a “majority of nations” at the conference supported the later accord. The U.N.’s press release insisted that the accord was supported by a broad array, including “the biggest and the richest, and the smallest and most vulnerable.”

To be blunt, the accord is not ambitious, specific or, as of yet, unanimously accepted. In summary, it sets forth the following terms:

• Similar to the earlier, short text, it recognizes that it is necessary to limit temperature in- creased to 2 degrees Celsius to preclude severe effects of climate change;

• It then generally provides for developed nations to commit to implement, individually or as a group, quantified “economy-wide” targets to be listed in the agreement before Jan. 31, 2010;

• Major developing nations with relatively prosperous economies agreed to communicate their efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions every two years, and they further agreed to make and list “voluntary pledges” before Jan. 31, 2010; and

• “Nationally appropriate” mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a “registry” together with support provided by developed nations, such as technology, finance and other assistance.

On the morning of Dec. 19, just before the conference closed, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon officially agreed to “take note” of the Copenhagen accord, but he did not formally approve it. This procedure leaves countries entirely free to decide whether they will associate with the agreement. Although Ban then announced that “[w]e have sealed the deal,” it is difficult to determine what, if anything, was truly agreed upon, which countries will ultimately associate with the accord, and what, if any, impact a legally non-binding accord will have.

Perhaps more candidly, Ban admitted that the accord “cannot be everything that everyone hoped for, but it is an essential beginning.” The U.N.’s top climate change official, Yvo de Boer, was more explicit.

“We must be honest about what we have got,” he said in the press release. “The world walks away from Copenhagen with a deal. But clearly ambitions to reduce emissions must be raised significantly if we are to hold the world to 2 degrees.”

Indeed, since the nations’ “voluntary pledges” are unknown, they may be insufficient to restrain temperature rises adequately. For that reason, some leaders called for a review of the accord no later than 2015, including consideration of reducing the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

Several other ideas also surfaced Dec. 19. Apparently, the participating heads of state and government also intend to “unleash prompt action” on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and capacity-building. To accomplish these projects, they announced the “Copenhagen green climate fund” to support immediate action on climate change. The collective commitment toward the fund by developed countries over the next three years is estimated at $30 billion.

For long-term finance, developed countries agreed to support a plan that resembles Clinton’s proposal to provide $100 billion annually by 2020 to assist developing countries. Additionally, to promote development and technology transfers, participating nations will work to develop a new technology mechanism supporting adaptation and mitigation.

While Obama’s exclamation that the accord is “unprecedented” may be technically true, his claim that the agreement is a “breakthrough” is surely premature. The accord does not oblige any nation to do any- thing to reduce the impact of climate change. Nothing has truly changed. The accord may, or may not, grow into a dialogue that ultimately produces a treaty, and that treaty may, or may not, be ratified by a two- thirds vote in the U.S. Senate. The agreement is a far cry from anything that can deal with climate change effectively, and the conference that produced it can only be labeled a failure.

The discontent of the developing world with the accord was plainly stated by Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping, the Sudanese diplomat who acted on behalf of the G77 group of nations. He condemned the agreement, saying “the developed countries have decided that damage to developing countries is acceptable.”

He and representatives of other vulnerable nations argued that the 2 degree reduction was not sufficiently aggressive and that it would “result in massive devastation to Africa and small island states.” They and other leaders, such as Chavez, felt excluded from the final discussions even though some of their nations were the most immediately affected. In particular, the needs of the Pacific island nations were overlooked as the leaders of more prominent countries rushed to make a “face-saving” non-binding agreement.

Some may believe that asking what went wrong is either premature or presumptuous. Nevertheless, although no one should pretend to know every answer, some observations are appropriate.

First and foremost, the conference relied too strongly on the politics of perception as opposed to practical possibilities. Although it was known from the beginning that it was virtually impossible to secure a legally binding agreement, the U.N. raised expectations unrealistically by making unwarranted and unjustified statements that a treaty was indeed possible. As a result, many participants developed false hopes for a positive outcome, only to see those hopes dashed when reality finally forced the conference’s inevitable failure. Clearly, insofar as obtaining real relief is concerned, the climate change movement is no better off than it would have been if the conference had never occurred.

Second, although the conference professed to be compassionate and concerned about the “vulnerable” nations most affected by climate change, it ultimately did nothing to assist them. Lesser agreements dealing only with those nations were “low-hanging fruit” that might have been obtained, and work could have begun immediately to help those most in need. Bypassing real hardship to deal with the comparatively esoteric and remote concerns of lesser affected nations was a huge mistake, both morally and politically. By doing so, the great powers demonstrated that their motives were not altruistic, or even universal, but primarily selfish and narrowly focused. This led to combative confrontations that surfaced at the beginning of the conference and continued until its closure — confrontations that poisoned the negotiating process, distanced compassion and empathy from the proceedings, and sacrificed the conference’s moral imperative.

Third, the conferees failed to appreciate and deal effectively with the reality of opposing political systems and economic systems, particularly regarding the Unit- ed States and China, but also regarding ambitious and emerging states generally. Many of the major players are frank competitors, both politically and economically, and many saw the conference as an opportunity to secure advantages in both spheres. The conflict between an “open” society, such as the United States, which understands democratic transparency and verification, and a “closed” society, such as China, which governs in a relatively opaque manner, is a fundamental obstacle. Such attitudes are difficult enough to reconcile when security issues are involved, but the problems are dramatically intensified when economic interests are concerned. Without comparable transparency between negotiating partners, it is unrealistic to expect meaningful compromises, yet the conferees proceeded to insist upon it as a condition of a binding agreement. Plainly, until the primacy of verification is accepted and until practical procedures are adopted to guarantee its availability, no meaningful or reliable treaty is possible.

Finally, the extremism of some within the environmental movement, and their tendency to include virtually all social and business issues in its agenda, has unfortunately transformed the movement with primarily political and economic objectives, as opposed to scientific or moral concerns. The Copenhagen conference resembled nothing so much as a gigantic, global political convention for the environmental movement, which used the event to stage a massive display of organizational power but failed to accomplish its substantive goals.

Surely, more progress would have been made if the movement had concentrated on core messages of scientific validity, humanitarian concern and practical relief. Instead, the central concerns were diffused and diluted by thinly disguised commercialism, media events, self- promotion and political showmanship. By attempting to be “everything to everyone,” the conference ended up delivering nothing to anyone.

One is tempted to compare the summit with the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, a “watershed” event for an entire generation, characterized by clashes between the forces of traditional dominance and idealistic activism. As that historic convention plunged into a disastrous, embarrassing and predict- able conclusion, so the Copenhagen conference, de- spite its glitter, publicity and enthusiasm, demonstrated the triumph of practical nationalism over international idealism and naiveté.

In Copenhagen, as in Chicago, the “whole world” was watching the events unfold, expecting a serious and dramatic denouement. Sadly, like the Democratic Party in Chicago, the climate change movement in Copenhagen now appears incapable of coordinating its constituencies to achieve meaningful reforms. Indeed, one wonders whether, after wasting all the political and financial capital expended in Copenhagen, the nations of the world will ever allow themselves to be drawn to such an illusory opportunity again.

Now that the play has ended, the players have left the stage and the audience members have returned to their homes, perhaps the issue of climate change can at last be analyzed and debated without unnecessary distractions. Even if the issue persists in the public mind, it is unlikely that the Copenhagen conference will produce a sequel. If anything is to follow, the disappointing performance of the original version demonstrates the necessity of a remake — from a different and truly altruistic script.